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This paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the 
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Germany,  however,  rightwing  governments  have  not  been  associated  with  propagating 
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policies at the federal level. 
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1. Introduction 
An  intriguing  question  in  Political  Economy  is  how  government  ideology  influences 
economic policy-making. Leftwing and rightwing governments have different preferences as 
to the size and scope of government and, thus, on economic policy. Leftwing governments 
favor  more  state  intervention,  more  income  redistribution,  and  expansionary  fiscal  and 
monetary policies. In contrast, rightwing governments believe in the free market and thus 
favor less state intervention in the economy. This alignment of  government ideology and 
economic policy-making has given rise to the partisan theories (Hibbs 1977, Alesina 1987). 
Political parties in office do, however, not always implement economic policies that are in 
line with the predictions of the partisan approach, maybe because of the large diversity of 
opinion  prevailing  in  modern  catch-all  parties.  In  a  similar  vein,  policy  positions  of  an 
individual party sometimes conflict with each other. The political right, for example, needs to 
bridge the divide between market-oriented views in economic policy and social conservatism 
(see, for example, Chakravarty 2008). Governments sometimes even implement policies that 
appear to contradict their political ideology. In the United States, for example, the Reagan 
administration presided over a massive increase of the government deficit which the leftwing 
government under President Clinton subsequently tried to reverse. In the United Kingdom, 
contrary to public perception, Labour was not a party for the poor during the second post-war 
Labour  period  (Beckerman  1972),  and  Prime  Minister  Blair  implemented  market-oriented 
reforms. Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) have argued (“When does it take a Nixon go to 
China?”) that leftwing governments may well have more political credibility to convince the 
electorate  of  market-oriented  reforms  in  economic  policy.  It  thus  remains  an  empirical 
question as to how government ideology influences economic policy-making. 
In order to investigate empirically how government ideology has influenced economic 
policy-making, scholars have used cross-country data as well as panel data and time series for 
individual countries (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997, Bjørnskov 2008, Broz 2011). A problem with   3
cross-country analysis is that institutional characteristics differ across countries. A country 
study  avoids  this  problem.  The  inferences  drawn  from  such  a  case  study  can  then  be 
transferred to other countries endowed with similar institutions. 
Germany is a particularly interesting case for various reasons. First, many observers 
believe  that  party  and  policy  polarization  between  the  dominant  parties  in  Germany,  the 
leftwing  Social  Democratic  Party  (SPD)  and  the  conservative  Christian  Democratic  Party 
(CDU/CSU),  have  nearly  disappeared.  Some  empirical  studies  suggest  that  government 
ideology has indeed not played a substantial role in German economic policy at the federal 
level (e.g, de Haan and Zelhorst 1993, Berger and Woitek 1997a, Koester 2009, Potrafke 
2009, 2012).
2 In the German states (Laender), government ideology also does not appear to 
have systematically influenced overall government expenditures, public debt, and revenues; 
the empirical evidence is however rather mixed (e.g., Seitz 2000, Jochimsen and Nuscheler 
2011,  Berger  and  Holler  2007,  Schneider  2007  and  2010,  Rodden  2001).  Government 
ideology has, on the other hand, influenced the composition of the government budget (e.g., 
Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007, Potrafke 2011). Rightwing governments spent somewhat more 
on  universities  than  leftwing  governments,  whereas  leftwing  governments  spent  more  on 
schooling.
3 This spending pattern appears to be in line with the preferences of the governing 
parties’  constituencies.  The  clientele  of  leftist  parties  profit  relatively  little  from  public 
expenditures on higher education but more from public expenditures on lower education. In a 
similar  vein,  rightwing  governments  spent  more  on  culture.  This  result  reflects  their 
constituencies´ appreciation of theatres, operas and art exhibitions, which contrast with the 
leisure preferences of the blue collar workers, the traditional constituency of the leftist parties 
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 Belke (1996, 2000) examines partisan cycles on unemployment and inflation, Vaubel (1997a, 1997b) and 
Berger and Woitek (1997b, 2005) investigate monetary partisan cycles in Germany. Politicians do not directly 
have an influence on monetary policy aggregates, due to institutional restrictions, most notably central bank 
independence. In any event, government ideology has an influence on appointments to the council of the central 
bank. A political party may tend to nominate council members with political preferences similar to its own 
(Vaubel 1993, 1997a). The nominated council members, in turn, may be loyal to the party which has appointed 
them (Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007). 
3 Schulze’s (2008) results suggest that conservative politicians tend to spend more on research in relative terms. 
His sample, however, contains only 16 observations.    4
(see,  for  example,  Schulze  and  Rose  1998,  Schulze  and  Ursprung  2000).  These  findings 
suggest that political preferences and policies do indeed vary across the German states. The 
question therefore arises as to how the pattern of political preferences and policies across the 
German states relate to the observed policy convergence at the federal level.  
A  second  reason  for  employing  German  data  is  the  German  Unification  in  1990. 
Because  the  German  Unification  was  a  momentous  historical  event,  political  economic 
analyses employing German data need to consider its consequences. It is conceivable that 
ideology-induced economic policy-making differs between East and West Germany. Previous 
studies on ideology-induced economic policy-making across the German Laender exclusively 
focused on the West German states. One of the most important reasons is the limited data 
availability for the former East German states. I will use the yet limited data for East Germany 
in order to investigate differences in economic policy and political ideology between East and 
West Germany.  
Third,  in  contrast  to  several  cross  country  and  country  studies,  scholars  have  not 
examined  whether  government  ideology  has  influenced  economic  freedom  in  Germany. 
Economic freedom indicators have been widely used in the political economy literature (e.g., 
Berggren 1999, Berggren and Jordahl 2005, de Haan 2003, de Haan et al. 2006). Economic 
freedom encompasses, for example, individual freedom to engage in voluntary transactions 
and property rights protection. Governments shape economic freedom; that is governments 
can invigorate economic freedom by, for example, enforcing contracts and diminish economic 
freedom by, for example, strictly regulating the economy or subsidizing particular industries. 
The  most  successful  measure  of  economic  freedom  has  been  developed  by  the  Fraser 
Institute. 
Empirical  evidence  on  government  ideology  and  economic  freedom  in  OECD 
countries  shows  that  market-oriented  governments  have  promoted  overall  economic 
liberalization (Pitlik 2007), privatization (e.g., Bortolotti and Pinotti 2008) and product market   5
deregulation (Potrafke 2010). In the Canadian provinces, rightwing governments have been 
more active in labor market liberalization (Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2011). Considering that 
ideology-induced policies tend to disappear at the federal level but preferences and policies 
differ  across  the  German  states,  investigating  the  influence  of  government  ideology  on 
economic liberalization across the German states is a worthwhile endeavor. 
In  view  of  the  related  literature  on  ideology-induced  policies  and  economic 
liberalization, the hypothesis to be investigated is: 
 
Have rightwing governments been more active in promoting economic freedom than leftwing 
governments across the German states? 
 
In  order  to  test  this  hypothesis,  I  employ  the  dataset  compiled  by  Fuest  et  al.  (2009)  on 
economic freedom across the German states. The results show that in former West Germany 
rightwing governments promoted economic freedom, whereas leftwing governments confined 
it. In former East Germany, however, rightwing governments have not been associated with 
propagating  economic  freedom.  This  finding  indicates  significant  differences  between 
political ideology and government behavior and thus conflicts with the commonly held notion 
of  policy  convergence  at  the  federal  level.  In  fact,  the  observed  variation  in  political 
preferences  across  states  may  indicate  that  politicians  gratify  the  local  electorate  and,  in 
return, offer moderate policies at the federal level. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides a short 
descriptive analysis of economic freedom and government ideology in the German states. 
Section 3 presents a panel data analysis: it specifies the empirical model and discusses the 
regression results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
   6
2. Data and descriptive analysis 
2.1 Economic freedom index for the German states 
I use the dataset on economic freedom across the German states compiled by Fuest et al. 
(2009).  The  dataset  contains  two  economic  freedom  indices.  The  L-index  of  economic 
freedom only refers to the West German states and covers the 1970-2007 period. The K-index 
of economic freedom refers to the West and East German states and covers the 1994-2007 
period. The ten former West German Laender included are Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, 
Bremen,  Hamburg,  Hesse,  Lower-Saxony,  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Rhineland-Palatine, 
Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. Data for the new Laender are only available since 1994, 
after  the  German  Unification  in  1990.  The  new  Laender  included  are  Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania,  Saxony,  Saxony-Anhalt,  Thuringia  and  Berlin.  I  assign 
Berlin  to  the  group  of  the  new  Laender,  because  it  was  divided  before  the  German 
Unification. 
The  economic  freedom  indices  by  Fuest  et  al.  (2009)  are  based  on  the  economic 
freedom indices by Gwartney  et al. (1996, 2009) and Karabegovic (2006). Gwartney and 
Lawson  (2003:  406  f.)  define  economic  freedom  as  follows:  “The  key  ingredients  of 
economic  freedom  are  personal  choice,  voluntary  exchange,  freedom  to  compete,  and 
protection  of  persons  and  property.  When  economic  freedom  is  present,  the  choices  of 
individuals will decide what and how goods and services are produced… 
…economic freedom also requires governments to refrain from many activities. They 
must refrain from actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the 
freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom is reduced 
when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are substituted for personal choice, 
voluntary exchange, and market coordination. Restrictions that limit entry into occupations 
and business activities also retard economic freedom.” 
   7
The economic freedom indices for the German states need to be adjusted to German 
institutional  characteristics.  The  Laender  governments  have  limited  authority  in  economic 
policy-making (e.g., Blankart 2008: Chapter 28, Blankart 2007: Chapter 7). Considering fiscal 
policy  the  limited  authority  mainly  affects  the  states’  revenue  side,  because  the  German 
Laender  are  not  autonomous  in  setting  tax  rates.  The  communities  in  the  states  possess, 
however,  policy  responsibility  in  shaping  corporate  taxation.  Debt  remains  as  the  only 
discretionary  source  of  financing  the  states’  expenses.  But  on  the  expenditure  side,  the 
governments in the states have policy responsibility. Yet their authority does not extend to all 
policy areas (see Seitz 2008). Consequently, the economic freedom index for the German 
states includes fewer components than the world economic freedom indices (e.g., Gwartney et 
al. 2009) and resembles the economic freedom indices for the Canadian provinces and US 
states (Karabegovic et al. 2003). To be sure, the economic freedom index for the German 
states  also  includes  the  entire  direct  tax  burden,  although  the  German  Laender  are  not 
autonomous in setting tax rates. The reason is that an economic freedom index excluding tax 
burden and taxes’ distortionary effects appears to be less significant. Fuest et al. (2009: 10) 
therefore  conclude that  their index illustrates how economic freedom  differs  across states 
given the policy interaction of the federal and state level. Federal tax policies influence the 
Laender in the same manner. I will thus focus on the cross-state variation in my empirical 
analysis. In any event, in the robustness tests section I will also discuss results when the tax 
components (and public investment) are ignored. 
The K-index is based on the following ten sub-indicators: 
 
1.  Size of government 
1a) Government consumption (as a share of GDP) 
1b) Public investment (as a share of total investment in the economy) 
1c) Public employment (as a share of total employment)   8
1d) Social expenditures (as a share of GDP) 
1e) Subsidies (as a share of GDP) 
 
2.  Taxes 
2a) Weighted average tax rates of the business tax 
2b) Tax revenues from income and corporate income taxes before fiscal equalization 
(as a share of GDP) 
 
3.  Mandatory social insurance and social welfare 
3a) Mandatory social insured employees (as a share of total employees) 
3b) Social welfare receivers (as a share of total population) 
3c) Social welfare level 
 
The L-index is based on eight out of these ten sub-indicators of economic activity. The 
subcategories 1e) Subsidies and 3c) Social welfare level are excluded because of limited data 
availability. Fuest et al. (2009) follow the weighting scheme of the Fraser Institute in order to 
aggregate  the  subcategories  to  the  entire  economic  freedom  indices.  The  indices  take  on 
values between 0 (minimum of economic freedom) and 10 (maximum of economic freedom). 
The dataset contains data in five year intervals for the 1970-1990 period (L-Index) and 
every four years for the 1994-2006 period (L-Index and K-Index). Data are also available for 
2004 and 2007 (L-index and K-index).  
Figure 1 illustrates that West Germany enjoyed a great deal of economic freedom in 
1970  (averages  –  L-Index).  The  economic  freedom  L-Index  reached  about  6  points  on 
average. In the beginnings of the 1970s economic freedom dramatically decreased. The size 
of government increased, partially as a consequence of the first oil crisis. Keynesianism was 
en vogue. The social welfare state was extended. In the 1990s, economic liberalization has   9
become more popular. Public employment declined. Figure 1 also shows that the economic 
freedom index has been much higher in the former West than East German states. Fuest et al. 
(2009) provide more detailed examples for economic (de)liberalization across the German 
states. 
Economic  freedom  has  been  highest  in  the  southern  Laender  Bavaria  and  Baden-
Wuerttemberg (Figure 2 and 3). Berlin, in which the Social Democrats and the Socialists have 
formed a coalition in 2001, is the least free state.  
 
2.2 The German political party landscape 
Two major political parties have dominated the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In 
Bavaria, Germany’s largest federal state by area, the conservatives are not represented by the 
CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The CDU and the CSU do 
not compete against each other; they form one faction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). 
This is why I label both as CDU in the empirical analysis. All federal chancellors and Prime 
ministers in the states of the last decades were members of one of these two major blocs, SPD 
and CDU. Therefore, one can test for ideology-induced effects on this left-right dimension. 
The much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have played an 
important role as coalition partners in West Germany. While the SPD has formed coalitions 
with all the other three parties, the CDU never formed a coalition with the Greens on the 
federal or state level during the period analyzed in this paper. In the former Eastern states, the 
socialist party (former PDS, since 2007 “DIE LINKE”) has played an important role. The 
Socialists have formed a coalition with the Social Democrats in Berlin and Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania. I will also consider the influence of the different coalition types, because 
the  left-right  dimension  may  neglect  ideological  differences  between  government  parties 
within a “camp” (e.g. for the Left between SPD/FDP, SPD/GR and SPD/LINKE coalitions).   10
As minority governments and other government formations have played a negligible role, 
they will be subsumed under the coalition types mentioned above. 
 
2.3 Correlation between economic freedom and government ideology 
In order to illustrate the association between government ideology and economic freedom, I 
present  correlations  between  the  averaged  economic  freedom  indices  and  averaged 
government ideology.  
The differences between leftist and rightwing governments will be tested on the left-
right scale using the variable “Left” as well as different coalition type variables respectively. 
These  variables  assume  values  between  zero  and  one  and  describe  the  share  of  leftwing 
governments or the respective coalition type over five our four years. I relate the average of 
government ideology over the last five or four years before period t to the economic freedom 
indices in period t. For example, the economic freedom index in 1970 is assigned to the 
average share of leftwing governments in the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. As the 
availability of the economic freedom indices changes from a five year to a four year interval 
after 1990, the economic freedom index in 1994, for example, is assigned to the average share 
of  leftwing  governments  in  the  years  1991,  1992,  1993  and  1994.  In  order  to  analyze 
consistently four year intervals from 1990 onwards, my sample ends in 2006. Inferences do 
not change when I consider the 2002-2007 interval as the last period. For simplicity, I focus 
on leftwing governments in this illustrative section and do not present figures for individual 
coalition types. 
The annual data for government ideology in the West German states are taken from 
Potrafke (2011). For the East German states, I follow Potrafke’s (2011) coding. The annual 
variable “Left” assumes the value of one in periods when a SPD Prime Minister was in office, 
the value zero when a CDU Prime Minister was in office and the value 0.5 when a grand   11
coalition (CDU/SPD government) was in office.
4 With respect to the grand coalitions, I do not 
distinguish which of the two parties appointed the Prime Minister. 
One  can  see  with  the  naked  eye  that  leftwing  governments  have  been  negatively 
associated with economic freedom in the West German states, and rightwing governments 
have been positively associated with economic freedom in West Germany (Figure 4 and 5). In 
the  former  East  German  states,  however,  this  association  is  not  valid  (Figure  6).  The 
correlation coefficient between the averaged economic freedom indices and the average share 
of leftwing governments for the 1970-2006 period in the West German states is -0.76 (L-
Index). The correlation coefficient between the averaged economic freedom indices and the 
average share of leftwing governments for the 1994-2006 period in the West German states is 
-0.44 (K-Index) and 0.21 in the former Eastern states (K-Index). 
The  finding  that  leftwing  governments  are  negatively  associated  with  economic 
freedom is much more pronounced when I exclude grand coalitions which may not be coded 
on a left-right scale (e.g., Potrafke 2011). In particular, grand coalitions were in power in 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  over  the  1967-1971  and  1992-1995  period  and  in  Bremen  over  the 
1995-2007.  When  grand  coalitions  are  excluded,  high  economic  freedom  in  Baden-
Wuerttemberg  is  exclusively  associated  with  rightwing  governments  and  low  economic 
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 Potrafke (2011) employs annual data and does not consider grand coalitions when coding the variable “Left”. In 
order to avoid missing values I code grand coaltions as 0.5 on a left-right scale.   12
3. Econometric analysis 
3.1 Econometric model 
The baseline panel data model has the following form: 
 
‘Economic Freedom index’ijt = Σk αk ‘Ideology’ikt + γ ‘Economic Freedom index’ijt-1  
+ ηi + εt + uijt                                             
 
with i= 1,…, 16;  j = 1, 2; k = 1,…,6
5               (2) 
 
where the dependent variable ‘Economic Freedom index’ijt denotes the economic freedom 
index  j  (L-Index  and  K-Index)  in  period  t.  Σk  αk  ‘Ideology’ikt  describes  the  ideological 
orientation of the respective government over the last five or four years. In the next paragraph 
I  describe  these  variables  and  their  coding  in  more  detail.  ‘Economic  Freedom  index’ijt-1 
describes the lagged dependent variable in order to control for the persistence of economic 
liberalization.  Lastly,  ηi  represents  a  fixed  state  effect,  εt  is  a  fixed  period  effect  and  uijt 
describes an error term.                                             
I include the averaged government ideology variables as described in Section 2.3 and 
distinguish  between  leftwing  governments  and  the  individual  coalition  types.  The  annual 
coalition type dummies assume the value of one when the considered coalition type was in 
power and zero otherwise. I distinguish between six different coalition types that governed in 
the former West German states: CDU, CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD, SPD/FDP, SPD/GR, and SPD. 
For the East German states, I also consider a SPD/LINKE dummy variable. To avoid perfect 
collinearity between the coalition type dummies, one of the coalition type dummies must 
function as the reference category (here SPD). The estimated effects of the other coalition 
type dummies must then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. In fact, 
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 The number of k again depends on the specification (see below).   13
regressing the economic freedom indices in period t on averaged government ideology over 
the  last  five  or  four  years  avoids  any  potential  endogeneity  concerns  of  the  government 
ideology variables. This specification also considers that governments need time in order to 
implement their preferred policies and influence economic liberalization.
6 
I  now  turn  to  my  choice  of  the  estimation  procedure.  In  the  context  of  dynamic 
estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator is biased. The estimators that take into account 
the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental estimators and a class of 
direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003, for example, for a discussion). In accordance 
with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano 
and  Bond  (1991)  will  be  biased  in  my  econometric  model  with  N=10  or  N=16.  For  this 
reason, bias corrected estimators are more appropriate. I apply Bruno´s (2005a, 2005b) bias 
corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small 
N.
7 Alternatively, I estimate the model without lagged dependent variable employing feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) with fixed state and fixed period effects. 
 
3.2 Basic Results 
Table 1 illustrates the regression results when the L-Index is used. The lagged dependent 
variable displays the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
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 The empirical approach differs from Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) for two important reasons. First, there are 
no annual data available for economic freedom across the German states. Second, Fuest et al. (2009) have 
included tax revenues from income and corporate income taxes although the state governments have no authority 
in setting tax rates. Fuest et al. (2009) point out that their index therefore tackles differences in economic 
freedom across states. The variation across states is, however, eliminated when growth rates of the economic 
freedom indicators are examined, so that employing levels in five to four year intervals is more appropriate. 
7
 I choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in which the instruments are collapsed as 
suggested by Roodman (2006). This procedure makes sure to avoid using invalid and too many instruments (see 
Roodman 2006 and 2009 for further details). Following Bloom et al. (2007) I undertake 50 repetitions of the 
procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Bootstrapping the standard errors is common practice 
applying this estimator. The reason is that Monte Carlo simulations demonstrated that the analytical variance 
estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (see Bruno 2005b for further 
details). The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions such as 100, 200 or 500 or when the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator. However, the ideology-induced effects are much 
more pronounced when the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator and the t-statistics of 
the ideology variables somewhat decrease with more repetitions of the bootstrapped standard errors.   14
columns (1) and (2). The fixed state and fixed period effects turn out to be jointly significant 
at the 1% level.  
The results in Table 1 show that rightwing governments have been more active in 
promoting economic freedom: the coefficient of the variable “Left” has a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (3). The 
numerical meaning of the coefficient in column (1) is that a corresponding increase of the 
variable ‘Left’ by one point – from 0 (rightwing government) to 1 (leftwing government) – 
would decrease the L-Index of economic freedom by about 0.1 points per period. The long-
run  effect  of  government  ideology  can  be  calculated  by  dividing  the  coefficient  of  the 
ideology variable by one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The results 
suggest that the economic freedom index was by about 0.3 points lower under a leftwing than 
under  a  rightwing  government  in  the  long-run.  The  numerical  impact  suggested  by  the 
coefficient of the ideology variable in column (3) is somewhat smaller. These differences may 
well arise due to the different sample sizes and potential omitted variable bias due to the 
exclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Columns (2) and (4) report the regression results 
when the ideology-induced effects are evaluated by individual coalition type dummies. The 
findings  suggest  that  the  influence  of  leftist  governments  on  economic  freedom  can  be 
identified by CDU and CDU/FDP coalitions. The coefficients of the CDU and CDU/FDP 
coalition type dummies have positive signs. They do not, however, turn out to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels in column (2), but are statistically significant at the 10% 
level in column (4). An F-Test indicates that the coalition dummy variables do not turn out to 
be jointly significant. Overall, the inclusion of the fixed state and fixed period effects strongly 
mitigates the influence of the government ideology variables. 
Table  2  illustrates  the  regression  results  when  the  K-Index  is  used.  The  lagged 
dependent variable again displays the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level in columns (1) and (2). Similar to the model in which the L-Index is used, the   15
fixed state and fixed period effects turn out to be jointly significant at the 1% level. The 
findings suggest that leftist governments have not changed economic freedom across East and 
West German states over the 1994-2006 period. The coefficients of the variable “Left” do not 
turn out to be statistically significant in columns (1) and (3). The individual coalition type 
dummies lack statistical significance in column (2). By contrast, the coefficients of CDU and 
SPD/FDP coalition type dummies have a positive sign and are statistically significant at the 
5% level in column (4). This finding indicates that pure CDU and SPD/FDP coalitions were 
associated with more economic freedom than pure SPD governments. In particular, economic 
freedom has been pronounced in Rhineland-Palatine under the SPD/FDP governments and in 
Bavaria under the pure CDU governments. These two effects also explain convincingly why 
the variable “Left” does not turn out to be statistically significant. The different results in 
columns (2) and (4) display the sensitivity of the results to the fairly small sample and the 
reduced sample due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.  
 
3.3 Robustness Checks 
I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. I have therefore included further (economic) control 
variables.  
A  typical  feature  of  Germany’s  fiscal  federalism  is  the  fiscal  equalization  system, 
which harmonizes revenues across states. Transfer payments circulate from the federal level 
to the states (vertical) as well as between the states (horizontal). Since 1995, the New German 
Laender  have  participated  in  the  system,  so  that  the  volume  of  payments  has  increased. 
Moreover,  the  German  states  are  of  two  different  types:  the  budgets  of  city-states  cover 
additional expenditures and revenues which are administered by local authorities in non-city 
states.  Fuest  et  al.  (2009:  10)  discuss  that  the  horizontal  fiscal  equalization  is  likely  to 
influence economic freedom across the German states. When states spend transfers, economic   16
freedom  will  decrease  because  states  need  to  increase  revenues  in  order  to  finance  the 
transfers.  When  states  receive  transfers,  economic  freedom  will  decrease  because 
governments can give more subsidies and intervene the market. 
I have included two variables that address the horizontal fiscal equalization system and 
consider  the  real  amount  of  money,  which  the  individual  state  received  or  spent.  In 
accordance with the coding of the ideology variables I have aggregated the annual transfer 
payment to five and four year averages. Table 3 shows that transfers received have negatively 
influenced  economic  freedom  (L-Index).  The  variable  “Fiscal  equalization  (transfers 
received)” is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (3) and (4) but does not turn 
out to be statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). The variable “Fiscal equalization 
(transfers spent)” does not turn out to be statistically significant in any equation. In any event, 
including these variables does not change the inferences regarding the ideology variables at 
all. The inferences regarding the K-Index of economic freedom also do not change compared 
to Table 2 when the fiscal equalization variables are included (results not shown). 
Including  economic  control  variables  such  as  GDP  per  capita,  GDP  growth  or 
unemployment  is,  however,  likely  to  cause  endogeneity  problems.  The  causality  between 
economic  freedom,  GDP  per  capita,  GDP  growth  or  unemployment  is  not  clear  (e.g., 
Compton et al. 2011, Justesen 2008, Dawson 2003, de Haan et al. 2006, de Haan and Sturm 
2000). Fuest et al. (2009) show that the economic freedom indices are positively associated 
with GDP per capita and economic growth and negatively associated with unemployment. In 
order  to  avoid  endogeneity  problems,  I  instrument  GDP  per  capita,  GDP  growth  and 
unemployment by their lagged values respectively.
8 I employ a panel instrumental variable 
estimator (IV) and do not employ GMM because the GMM estimators are biased for small N. 
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 Data for GDP are available from 1970 onwards. In order to achieve real GDP per capita, I divide these data by 
total population and deflate the data by the German consumer price index at the federal level. The reason is that 
consumer price indices are not available for all German states for the entire time period. Including averaged 
GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth in the econometric model thus results in a smaller sample that starts 
in 1975. Data for unemployment rates are available from 1968 onwards for all former West German states. In   17
Table 4 shows the regression results using the IV estimator. Applying this estimator, 
results are similar to the ones in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The effect of the variable “Left” on the L-
index is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) and at the 5% level 
in columns (3) and (7). The coefficients of the unemployment rate in columns (1) and (2) have 
the expected negative signs but do not turn out statistically significant. The coefficients of 
GDP per capita growth in columns (3) and (4) have negative signs but also do not turn out to 
be statistically significant. The coefficients of GDP per capita in columns (5) to (8) have 
positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The numerical meaning of the 
coefficients  is  that  the  L-index  increases  by  about  4×10
-5  points  when  GDP  per  capita 
increases  by  1  Euro.  Against  the  background  of  a  mean  of  17.805  Euros  and  standard 
deviation of about 9.624 Euros of the GDP per capita in the sample, the estimated effect is 
plausible.  The  results  in  column  (5)  illustrate  that  the  variable  “Left”  lacks  statistical 
significance when GDP per capita is included. The reason is that GDP per capita is strongly 
correlated with the fixed period effects. Statistical significance of the fixed period effects 
strongly decreases when GDP per capita is included. Columns (7) and (8) therefore show 
regressions in which the fixed period effects are excluded. This turns the ideology variables 
statistically significant as in the previous specifications. Including GDP per capita also turns 
the CDU/SPD variable statistically significant at the 1% level with a negative coefficient. 
Including further economic control variables does not change the inferences regarding the 
ideology variables. Inferences also do not change when the fiscal equalization variables are 
included in the IV-regressions. 
Economic liberalization in an individual state could also be influenced by economic 
liberalization in the neighboring states.
9 I have therefore included a spatially lagged dependent 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
order to use the L-index in 1970 I regress it on the average of the unemployment rates in 1968, 1969 and 1970. 
From 1975 onwards I regress the L-index on averaged unemployment rates over the last five or four years. 
9
 Spatial dependencies also influence voting patterns. See, for example, Cutts and Webber (2010).   18
variable  that  considers  geographical  neighbors.
10  The  spatial  weight  matrix  is  row-
normalized.  I  have  estimated  a  spatial  lag  model  using  2SLS  and  regressed  the  spatially 
weighted dependent variable on the explanatory and spatially weighted explanatory variables 
in the first stage. The spatially lagged dependent variables do not turn out to be statistically 
significant.  Including  them  does  not  change  the  inferences  regarding  the  coalition  type 
ideology variables, yet the leftwing ideology variable lacks statistical significance when the 
spatially lagged dependent variable is included.  
It is conceivable that including the initial level of economic freedom influences the 
inferences. For example, in the East the initial level of economic freedom is much lower than 
in the West (see Figure 3). In a similar vein, with a low initial level of economic freedom, also 
leftwing governments may feel the need to increase economic freedom, less so when the level 
of economic freedom is already high. To test this conjecture, I have followed Sturm and de 
Haan (2003), and estimated the models including the initial level of economic freedom for 
1970 (L-Index) and for 1994 (K-index). Because the initial levels of economic freedom do not 
vary over time, I cannot include fixed state effects in these regressions and have estimated the 
model including fixed period effects using OLS with robust standard errors. Including the 
initial level of economic freedom is very similar to running a fixed effects panel data model 
because the initial level of economic freedom is fixed for every individual state. The initial 
level of economic freedom has the expected positive influence and is statistically significant 
when no lagged dependent variable is included. The lagged dependent variable thus explains a 
great deal of the variation in the dependent variable. In any event, inferences regarding the 
ideology-induced  effects  do  not  change.  By  contrast,  the  ideology-induced  effects  on 
economic freedom in the West German states also remain statistically significant in the IV 
regressions when GDP per capita is included.  
                                                                        
10
 See, for example, Anselin (1988) on the basic econometric models to describe spatial interaction and Allers 
and Elhorst (2005) on applications with cross-sectional data.   19
The German  Laender  governments have limited responsibility in economic policy-
making. The economic freedom indices compiled by Fuest et al. (2009) contain economic 
characteristics  that  are  in  the  domain  of  the  federal  government’s  responsibility  or  the 
responsibility of the communities. For example, category 2a) of the economic freedom index 
refers  to  the  weighted  average  of  the  business  tax  rates.  Setting  business  tax  rates  is  the 
responsibility of the communities not the Laender.
11 Category 2b) refers to tax revenues from 
income  and  corporate  income  taxes  before  fiscal  equalization  for  which  the  federal 
government (and the second parliamentary chamber) are responsible. Moreover, one might 
also argue that higher public investment (category 1b) does not diminish economic freedom. 
The  reason  is  that  also  advocates  of  market-oriented  policies  favor  spending  government 
expenditures for public investment such as for roads instead of income redistribution. I have 
therefore excluded the categories 1b, 2a and 2b of the overall economic freedom indices and 
calculated the average of the remaining five categories for the K-Index and the remaining 
seven categories for the L-Index. Inferences overall do not change: the ideology variables lack 
statistical significance when the dynamic bias corrected estimator is used (L-Index), but are 
statistically significant with the FGLS and also IV-estimators (L-Index). Again, government 
ideology did not have an influence on the now modified K-Index which also includes the new 
German Laender. 
The reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in the 
individual  states.  For  this  reason,  I  tested  whether  the  results  are  sensitive  to  the 
inclusion/exclusion of particular states. The results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of 
Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hamburg. The negative effect of leftist governments on 
                                                                        
11
 Consequently, business taxes appear to be a less qualified indicator of state governments’ economic policy-
making. The predominance of a political party has, however, not only affected policies in the states but also the 
communities. The Christian Social Union (rightwing party) in Bavaria is a prime example. A great share of the 
mayors in the Bavarian communities has been members of the Christian Social Union. Leading party members 
such as mayors in communities often have leading positions in party committees at the state level and 
significantly influence a party’s political ideology. State governments and prime ministers are, in turn, obliged to 
the political ideology of their party committees and vice versa. For this reason, state governments and leading 
party members at the state level are also likely to influence business tax rates.   20
economic freedom becomes somewhat weaker when excluding Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg 
and Hamburg. In contrast, the negative effect of leftist governments on economic freedom 
becomes stronger when excluding Bremen. 
 
4. Conclusion  
The ideology of state governments influenced economic freedom across the West German 
states: rightwing governments have been more active in promoting economic liberalization 
than  leftwing  governments.  Against  the  background  of  policy  convergence  at  the  federal 
level,  this  is  a  significant  finding.  Government  ideology  has  not,  however,  influenced 
economic freedom across the East German states. 
Overall, one needs to interpret the results with care because of the limited economic 
policy-making  authority  of  the  Laender.  The  inferences  do  not,  however,  appear  to  be  a 
statistical coincidence but clearly reflect the true association between economic freedom and 
government ideology and political preferences in Germany. Voters in the southern Laender 
such as Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg are much more conservative and market-oriented 
than  the  voters  in  the  former  Eastern  German  states.  Political  polarization  is  particularly 
strong in states such as Hesse. 
The  results  support  previous  research  that  the  observed  variation  in  political 
preferences  across  and  within  the  German  states  may  well  have  influenced  policy 
convergence at the federal level. The reason is that politicians are not only ideology-induced 
but also election-motivated and will thus offer moderate policy platforms to gratify the entire 
German  electorate.  My  results  therefore  open  an  avenue  for  future  research  on  political 
economic analysis in federal states: a more encompassing theory is required to portray how 
diversified political preferences in federal states may lead to policy convergence at the federal 
level. Such an approach could complement or even change the divided government theory by 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and influence theories on bicameralism (e.g., Testa 2010).   21
My results suggest that government ideology has not been associated with economic 
freedom  in  East  Germany.  Several  reasons  spring  to  mind  and  some  require  further 
investigations.  First,  reconstructing  the  economy  after  communism  collapsed  has  been  a 
difficult task. Parties did not have and could not build on established traditions in the former 
East German states. Future research may analyze more deeply why the different historical 
experiences of those who live in the East and West German parts have come to view what 
comprises Right and Left in Politics differently. Second, East Germany may be economically 
less  free  because  of  migration.  Young  and  highly  qualified  citizens  have  left  the  Eastern 
states, whereas old and less qualified citizens have stayed (e.g., Hunt 2006, Burda 2006).
12 
Unemployment is higher in the Eastern states (e.g., Arntz and Wilke 2009). Consequently, the 
number of transfer receivers is quite high in East Germany and economic freedom is low. 
Third, the revival of the Socialists (DIE LINKE) requires further research. The Socialists have 
been very successful in several state elections in the 2007-2009 period. In fact, the Socialists 
received  many  more  votes  than  the  Social  Democrats.  In  the  2009  federal  election,  the 
Socialists won electoral districts outside Berlin for the first time. I expect the ideological 
cleavage between East and South Germany to persist.  
Scholars may also want to investigate whether  differences between party  positions 
across  the  states  influence  economic  policy-making.  For  example,  the  CDU  in  Baden-
Wuerttemberg  appears  to  be  more  conservative  than  the  CDU  in  Hamburg.  Studies  on 
political  ideology  in  the  United  States  deal  with  regional  party  characteristics.  The  DW 
NOMINATE data on political positions in the US Congress by Poole and Rosenthal (1996) 
relax the assumption that members of specific parties hold the same ideological positions 
across the US states. An alternative to measure partisanship and political ideology is to use 
exit poll data (e.g., Larcinese et al. 2010), which also allow taking into account ideological 
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 On labor mobility and regional disparities in unemployment between East and West Germany see Niebuhr et 
al. (2011).   22
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Figure 2: L-Index of Economic Freedom 
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Figure 4: Correlation between averaged Economic Freedom (L-Index) and the share of 
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Figure 5: Correlation between averaged Economic Freedom (K-Index) and the share of 
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Figure 6: Correlation between averaged Economic Freedom (K-Index) and the share of 
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Table 1: Regression Results. Dependent variable: L-Index of economic freedom. 
West German states. 1970-2006. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dynamic  Dynamic  FGLS  FGLS 
Left  -0.1118*    -0.1702**   
  [1.90]    [2.33]   
CDU    0.1571    0.1953* 
    [1.51]    [1.86] 
CDU/FDP    0.1355    0.1615* 
    [1.32]    [1.68] 
CDU/SPD    -0.1889    -0.0737 
    [1.41]    [0.62] 
SPD/FDP    0.0174    -0.0238 
    [0.15]    [0.23] 
SPD/GR    0.009    -0.0466 
    [0.08]    [0.41] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.7073***  0.6469***     
  [7.33]  [5.88]     
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  80  80  90  90 
Number of n  10  10  10  10 
R-squared (overall)      0.50  0.52 




Table 2: Regression Results. Dependent variable: K-Index of economic freedom. 
West and East German states. 1994-2006. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dynamic  Dynamic  FGLS  FGLS 
Left  -0.0386    0.0194   
  [0.27]    [0.21]   
CDU    0.0164    0.3616** 
    [0.07]    [2.12] 
CDU/FDP    0.1407    -0.115 
    [0.54]    [1.00] 
CDU/SPD    -0.3301    0.0618 
    [1.36]    [0.48] 
SPD/FDP    0.4981    0.6347** 
    [0.49]    [2.18] 
SPD/GR    0.1036    -0.1105 
    [0.37]    [1.14] 
SPD/LINKE    -0.2406    0.0231 
    [0.73]    [0.11] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.5933***  0.5912***     
  [3.64]  [3.46]     
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  48  48  64  64 
Number of n  16  16  16  16 
R-squared (overall)      0.01  0.03 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Regression Results. Fiscal Equalization System. 
Dependent variable: L-Index of economic freedom. 
West German states. 1970-2006. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dynamic  Dynamic  FGLS  FGLS 
Left  -0.1285**    -0.1445**   
  [2.18]    [2.00]   
CDU    0.1752    0.1978* 
    [1.59]    [1.95] 
CDU/FDP    0.1761    0.1466 
    [1.58]    [1.52] 
CDU/SPD    -0.2207    0.0091 
    [1.29]    [0.08] 
SPD/FDP    0.0136    0.0474 
    [0.12]    [0.46] 
SPD/GR    0.0062    -0.057 
    [0.05]    [0.52] 
Fiscal Equalization (transfers received)  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0008**  -0.0008** 
  [1.08]  [0.47]  [2.52]  [2.46] 
Fiscal Equalization (transfers spent)  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  5×10
-5 
  [0.68]  [1.00]  [0.96]  [0.75] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.6815***  0.6634***     
  [6.70]  [5.50]     
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  80  80  90  90 
Number of n  10  10  10  10 
R-squared (overall)      0.55  0.57 
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 Table 4: Regression Results. Instrumental Variable regressions including: GDP per capita growth, unemployment rate, GDP per capita 
Dependent variable: L-Index of economic freedom. West German states. 1970-2006. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Left  -0.1882***    -0.2728**    -0.0473    -0.1362**   
  [2.58]    [2.10]    [0.61]    [2.14]   
CDU    0.2078**    0.3302*    0.0725    0.1271 
    [2.06]    [1.94]    [0.79]    [1.49] 
CDU/FDP    0.2015*    0.2460**    0.0482    0.1544* 
    [1.93]    [2.08]    [0.54]    [1.79] 
CDU/SPD    -0.1992    -0.2629*    -0.3765***    -0.3650*** 
    [1.24]    [1.86]    [3.43]    [2.96] 
SPD/FDP    -0.0007    -0.0678    -0.0316    -0.0163 
    [0.01]    [0.55]    [0.34]    [0.16] 
SPD/GR    -0.039    0.0261    -0.0179    -0.0511 
    [0.36]    [0.23]    [0.21]    [0.54] 
Unemployment rate  -0.0336  -0.016             
  [0.99]  [0.42]             
GDP per capita growth      -20.9872  -18.2481         
      [0.66]  [0.69]         





          [3.74]  [4.47]  [11.64]  [11.26] 
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Observations  80  80  70  70  70  70  70  70 
Number of n  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
R-squared (overall)  0.51  0.48  0.33  0.45  0.08  0.13  0.15  0.20 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Source 
L-Index of Economic Freedom  90  5.97  0.72  4.4  7.6  Fuest et al. (2009) 
K-Index of Economic Freedom  64  5.85  0.92  4.4  7.4  Fuest et al. (2009) 
Left  114  0.51  0.45  0  1  Own calculations 
SPD  114  0.21  0.38  0  1  Own calculations 
CDU  114  0.26  0.43  0  1  Own calculations 
CDU/FDP  114  0.17  0.35  0  1  Own calculations 
CDU/SPD  114  0.12  0.30  0  1  Own calculations 
SPD/FDP  114  0.11  0.28  0  1  Own calculations 
SPD/GR  114  0.10  0.27  0  1  Own calculations 
SPD/LINKE  114  0.03  0.17  0  1  Own calculations 
Fiscal Equalization  
(transfers received)  114  232.48  458.72  0  2815.50 
German Federal Statistical 
Office 
Fiscal Equalization  
(transfers spent)  114  232.47  554.52  0  2447.46 
German Federal Statistical 
Office 
Unemployment  114  9.46  5.68  0.27  21.68  Federal Employment Office 
GDP per captia growth, real 
104  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.20 
Research Group 
“Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder”,  
deflated by myself 
GDP per captia, real 
104  17804.83  9623.98  3220.07  49606.76 
Research Group 
“Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder”,  
deflated by myself 
 
 
Table A2: Data description 
Variable  Description  Source 
Economic Freedom 
indices 
See above  Fuest et al. (2009) 
Fiscal Equalization  
(transfers received) 
Horizontal fiscal equalization, transfers received, at 
constant prices, million EUROS 
German Federal 
Statistical Office 
Fiscal Equalization  
(transfers spent) 
Horizontal fiscal equalization, transfers received, at 
constant prices, million EUROS 
German Federal 
Statistical Office 
Unemployment Rate  Referring to the dependent civilian labor force  Federal Employment 
Office 




GDP per capita  at constant prices  Research Group 
“Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der 
Länder” 
 